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NOTES
COURTS - FEDERAL JURISDICTION - PENDENT JURISDICTION RULE. -
A noteworthy summary of the existing divergence of opinion
upon the question of pendent or derivative federal jurisdiction
is contained in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations.1 The pendent jurisdiction rule
extends to the federal courts jurisdiction of non-federal claims
when such claims are closely interwoven with a federal claim
upon which the federal court can properly act. Otherwise sig-
nificant merely as a continuation of a dispute of long standing
in the Second Circuit,2 the Kleinman case develops at length two
distinct interpretations of the pendent jurisdiction rule, either
of which may be amply supported in logic. On the one hand,
Judge Augustus Hand, representing the majority view of the
Second Circuit court, states with candor and persuasiveness the
position which the court has maintained since 1933, when the
Supreme Court laid out the rule of pendent jurisdiction in the
decision in Hum v. Oursler 3; on the other hand, vigorously as-
serting the argument for a more liberal construction of the rule
in the Hum case, which position, though clearly the minority
view, is supported by the legal writers,4 is Judge Charles E.
Clark, himself a writer of great distinction in several fields of
the law.5
Principally an economy measure aimed at reducing the need
for production of overlapping testimony in both federal and state
courts, the pendent jurisdiction rule extends jurisdiction to the
federal courts in proper cases in preference to referring the mat-
ter to state courts for what usually is useless litigation. Jurisdic-
tion so acquired is not lost by the fact that the federal question,
assuming it to be a substantial claim, is for one reason or another
dismissed.6 . As early as 1824, in the decision in Osborn v. United
States Bank,7 the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Marshall, evidenced approval of such a jurisdic-
1. 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
2. See, e.g., Zalkind v. Scheinman, 130 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943);Musher Foundation
v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942); Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F.2d 16
(2d Cir. 1939); and dissents contained therein.
3. 289 U.S. 238 (1932).
4. See, e.g., 60 Harv. L. Rev. 424, 430 (1947); 52 Yale L.J. 922 (1943); 2 Callmann,
The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks, §91.2 (a), (b), (e), (d) (1945).
5. See, e.g., Clark, Code Pleading (2d ed. 1947); Covenants and Interests Running
with the Land (2d Ed. 1947).
6. Warner Publications v. Popular Publications, 87 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1937).
7. 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
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tional extension when it said, "We think, then, that when a ques-
tion to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the
power of Congress to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction of that
cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved
in it."8 And in the 1909 case of Silver v. Louisville and Nashville
R.R. Co.,9 the germination of the pendent jurisdiction rule, which
was to burst into bloom in the Hurn case, continued when it was
decided that federal jurisdiction existed in a case where the fed-
eral action had been decided against the plaintiff, or not de-
cided at all.
Manifestly the broadening sphere of federal jurisdictional
influence and consequent shrinkage of the state jurisdictional do-
main must be halted at a point consistent with economic principles
and with federal constitutional restrictions."i Basically, it would
seem, this is the parting of the ways in the opinions of Judge Clark
and his colleagues. Clark, a proponent of liberal joinder and
judicial economy, would extend the federal sphere farther, it
would seem, even" than the Supreme Court contemplated in the
Hum case and would include within the pendent jurisdiction
rule all claims dependent upon a single set of operative facts,-
Clark's colleagues on the Second Circuit bench, traditionally re-
luctant to encroach upon state jurisdiction solely for the sake
of judicial economy, 12 have narrowly and properly, it would seem,
required substantially identical proof in proving the federal and
the non-federal claim to justify the application of the pendent
jurisdiction rule. As one district judge put the issue, Clark is
contending for "substantial identity of right" and the majority
"substantial identity of proof' as the test for the rule's applica-
tion.' 3 Some doubt has been suggested as to the constitutionality
of Clark's proposed extension.1
4
Having thus considered, if only briefly, some of the factors
contributing to the breach between Judge Clark and the other
judges of the Second Circuit court, considerably more difficulty
is met in an attempt to define the exact point of conflict of the
divergent viewpoints. Clearly, however, the source of the con-
8. Id. at 823.
9. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
10. U.S. Const. Art. 111, §2.
11. See Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1939) (dissenting opinion).
12. Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
13. See Schreyer v. Casco products Corp., 89 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn. 1950).
14. Strachman v. Palmer, 82 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1949), rev'd, 177 F.2d 427
(1st Cir. 1949).
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troversy is the Hurn case, upon which both Judge Clark and his
colleagues purportedly rely. In the Hum case, taken on certiorari
from the Second Circuit, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided that jurisdiction of a non-federal count of unfair competi-
tion joined with a claim of copyright infringement had been improp-
erly refused, although the federal claim had been dismissed for
lack of infringement, in a case where (1) the facts needed to
support the non-federal count were substantially identical to those
needed to prove the federal count ; (2) the two claims were but
separate counts of a single cause of action; and (3) the federal
claim was a substantial claim. Significant also was the court's
disposition of a further claim for unfair competition as to an un-
copyrighted revision of the play, which was the subject of the al-
leged infringement in the principal claim. Upon this point, the
court sustained the trial court's ruling refusing jurisdiction be-
cause the non-federal claim was wholly independent of the federal
claim. In subsequent decisions, inferior courts have treated each
of the bases for the decision in Hum v. Oursler as a valid limita-
tion upon the general rule of pendent jurisdiction.1 5
While most of the so-called limitations of the Hum rule have
been variously interpreted and widely argued, there exists rela-
tive tranquility as to the application of the "substantial federal
claim" phase of the rule and, in fact, at least one critic of the Sec-
ond Circuit majority has upon this point commended the court's
position.16 Substantiality, in this instance, is determined without
regard to the disposition of the claim and thus, a claim, substan-
tial as alleged in the complaint, continues to be so considered,
although it is subsequently dismissed%1 7 A United States Supreme
Court decision to the contrary,"8 was impliedly, at least, overruled
by the decision in Hurn v. Oursler. In that case, the court had
held a federal claim of trademark infringement to be "unsubstan-
tial" and refused to decide the common law count of unfair com-
petition, where the trademark was found to be invalid. And a
later Supreme Court decision 19 took the position that a federal
15. Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1950) (no jurisdiction of
non-federal claim because it is separate cause of action from federal cause of action);
French Renovating Co. v. Ray Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1948) (no juris-
diction of non-federal claim because facts needed to support non-federal count are not
substantially identical to those needed to support federal claim); Also see Pure Oil Co.
v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942) (federal claim, with which non-federal
claim is joined, must be substantial).
16. See 52 Yale L.J. 922 (1943).
17. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1932). But cf. Foreign & D.M. Corp. v. Twentieth
Century-Fox F. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
18. Lesehen Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U.S. 166 (1906).
19. Levering & G. Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
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claim was not substantial where the question had been foreclosed
by a prior Supreme Court decision. This decision stands un-
repudiated but not unreproved.2 0
Close scrutiny of the rule of the Hurn case as to the unfair
competition of the uncopyrighted revision of the play will show
that this is little more than a negative restatement of the "sub-
stantially identical facts" rule, upon which the principal decision
was based. Thus, if the non-federal claim is based upon facts
not substantially identical with the facts upon which the federal
claim is predicated, the federal court clearly has no jurisdiction
of the non-federal count. In its application, however, this limita-
tion of the Hum rule has become integrated with a chronologi-
cal consideration. In Foster D. Snell, Inc. v. Potter,'-" for example,
the Second Circuit court cited this phase of the Hurn rule as
controlling where, in a case of patent infringement, plaintiff had
also alleged violation of a licensing agreement prior to the issu-
ance of the patent. The court there said, "It relates to a different
period of time, and depends upon facts which are irrelevant to
the proof of the federal cause of action"; 22 and therefore juris-
diction was refused. It has been suggested, however, that no
less justification exists for retaining jurisdiction in cases of this
kind than in a case where the non-federal claim arose at the same
time as the federal claim since in both instances the federal court
has no original jurisdiction.
23
Largely determinative of the circumstances upon which the
rule of pendent jurisdiction will be applied and the source of
most abundant disagreement is the limitation of the Hum rule to
separate counts of a single cause of action. Closely allied is the
"substantially identical facts" rule, which is now generally re-
garded as the test for a cause of action. Although courts often
discuss one of these factors to the exclusion of the other. It must
be conceded as settled that impliedly, at least, the other is in-
volved to the extent that proving one is proof of the other. There
would seem to be some doubt as to whether this is an entirely
accurate characterization of the Hum rule 24 and in view of the
broad definition accorded a cause of action in cases of this kind
20. See Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion).
21. 88 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1937).
22. Id. at 612.
23. See Yale L.J. 922, 926 (1943).
24. Strachman v. Palmer, 82 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1949).
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by the court in Hurn v. Oursler,2 5 it would seem possible that a
single cause of action might exist, the single counts of which can-
not be proven by substantially identical facts. This view is not
shared by the courts.
Contained in the Kleiman case 26 is an excellent illustration of
the cohtrasting attitudes of Judge Clark and his colleagues toward
the meaning of the "substantially identical facts" rule. In that
case, plaintiff sought recovery for an alleged patent infringe-
ment and for defendant's breach of contract to pay plaintiff for
the use of the patented article. In the lower court, the claim of
infringement was dismissed upon its merits and jurisdiction of
the claim of breach of contract was refused, the court not having
found diversity of citizenship of the parties. In sustaining this
holding, the Second Circuit court said recovery upon the breach
of contract count must be predicated upon proof of (1) the ex-
istence of the contract; (2) that the goods were of use to -the
defendant; (3) that the defendant sold the goods; (4) that the
defendant failed to pay for them; and (5) the fair compensation
due. In order to prove the patent infringement claim, the ma-
jority contended, only point 3 would have to be proved and point
2 by implication. Points 1, 4 and 5 would not need to be shown.
Judge Clark's position is that the first claim undertakes to show
that (1) plaintiff had a novel idea for commercial device; (2)
which was wrongfully appropriated; (3) wrongfully because in
violation of a patent grant. The second or non-federal count
repeats points 1 and 2 and only point 3 varies. Assuming, how-
ever, the accuracy of Judge Clark's analysis, it would seem evident
that considerable proof is necessary to sustain the additional non-
federal charge once the federal claim has been proved, or, as
in this case, disproved. He has, for example, consolidated into
point 3 of his own analysis, all that which was contained in points
1, 4 and 5 in the majority opinion and there is thus little conflict
as to the amount of proof necessary to prove the additional charge.
The issue then narrows into a disagreement as to what consti-
tutes enough "additional" evidence to take the case out of the
25. Adopting wording of Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)
"A cause of action does not consist of facts but of the unlawful violation of a right
which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more
than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or
in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong. The facts
are merely the means and not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action, but
they show its existence by making the wrong appear."
26. 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
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"substantially identical facts" rule. As to this, the position of the
Second Circuit majority has been stated to be that "that test (the
substantially identical facts rule) . . . is not hard and fast; the
question is one of degree but the allowable lattitude, as the Su-
preme Court decisions go, is indeed narrow."2 7 Judge Clark, clear-
ly evidencing the view that the need for judicial economy out-
weighs any insignificant loss of state power, however, has said,
"If the roast must be reserved for the federal bench, it is anoma-
lous to send the gravy across the street to the state court house."28
It should not be assumed, in view of the express statements
that the Hurn rule has been given a narrow interpretation by the
Second Circuit majority,20 that it is a dead rule in that circuit.
It is, to the contrary, applied or refused upon the circumstances
of each case. That the rule is one which must be applied accord-
ing to the circumstances of the particular case is substantiated
by wording in Judge Clark's concurring opinion in Collins v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.0 The pendent jurisdiction rule
has been applied, for example, in a case where the Waterman
Pen Co." was complaining of trademark infringement and unfair
competition for the use of the name "Waterman" on razor blades.
Jurisdiction of the non-federal claim was retained, although the
federal claim had been dismissed, upon a finding that the facts
necessary to support each of the counts were substantially identi-
cal. Likewise, in Warner Publications v. Popular Publications,
3 2
jurisdiction to try an unfair competition count upon its merits
was sustained where the alleged trademark infringement and the
unfair competition count were pleaded as two separate causes
of action, clearly in violation of the Hurn rule if correctly pleaded.
The court decided, however, that the claims were in fact but
separate counts of a single cause of action. And in a case where
jurisdiction of a consent decree made prior to the decision in
Hum v. Oursler was challenged, the court, finding that both the
federal and the non-federal claims were sustainable upon substan-
tially identical facts, refused to upset the decree, 33 although at
the time of the issuance of the decree, the Second Circuit rule
was not in accord with that which was subsequently set out in
27. Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1943).
28. Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1942).
29. See Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1943).
30. 106 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1939).
31. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934).
32. 87 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1937).
33. Winthrop Chemical Co. v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 94 F.2d 587 (2d Cir.
1938).
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the Hum case.34 Where, however, any appreciable proof is neces-
sary to prove the non-federal claim in addition to that which is
necessary to prove the federal claim, jurisdiction has generally been
refused upon the authority of Hum v. Oursler." Although it is
apparent that no distinct division, applicable to all cases, sepa-
rates the two types of cases, it would seem clear that the quan-
tum of additional proof necessary to deprive the federal court
of jurisdiction over the non-federal claim is microscopic. Rejec-
tion of jurisdiction, rather than its retention, is more common in
the Second Circuit.
At the other extreme is Judge Clark, who, while not wishing
to extend the rule of pendent jurisdiction to every case in which
a federal claim is joined with a non-federal claim, 6 would retain
jurisdiction for the federal courts where there is substantial iden-
tity of right.3. Thus, for example, where a right arises by reason
of plaintiff's invention, Clark would, it appears, extend federal
jurisdiction to every violation of this right, however extensive this
might be. These violations, then, could take the form of patent
infringement, unfair competition, breach of contract or common
law tort. Consistent with this position and frequently alluding
to the need for judicial economy,3" Clark has argued for an ex-
tension of the pendent jurisdiction rule to include a case where
the non-federal acts alleged took place prior to the existence of
the federal claim 9 or were only incidentally related, 0 and to
include a case where the bill as finally amended was clearly out-
side the Hum case, although as originally pleaded it would have
been subject to the pendent jurisdiction rule. " Similarly he would
treat as only provisional and not appealable a judgment in the
lower court, in which the non-federal count had not been tried
on its merits when that count was, so Clark says, inextricably
interwoven with a substantial federal claim. 42 Plaintiff had there
sought to join a federal claim of patent violation with a claim
34. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932), rev'd on other
grounds, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
35. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1950);
Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1939).
36. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939).
37. See note 13, supra.
38. See, e.g., Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, 189 F.2d 546, 551 (2d Cir. 1951);
Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 906 (2d Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinions); See
also Treasure Imports v. Henry Arndur & Sons, 127 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1942) (concurring
opinion).
39. See Treasure Imports v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 127 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1942)
.(concurring opinion).
40. See Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinion).
41. See Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1939).
42. See Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 906 (2d Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinion).
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founded upon alleged fraudulent misrepresentations 'of the de-
fendant in the United States patent office, which acts had caused
plaintiff some delay in obtaining his patent. Little imagination is
necessary to comprehend the additional proof necessary to sus-
tain the non-federal charge of this complaint. Such an extension
of the pendent jurisdiction rule, while possibly entirely commend-
able, would seem to be unwarranted under the holding of the
Hum case.
In view of the fact that a large percentage of the cases involv-
ing the principle herein discussed have arisen in the Second Cir-
cuit, it can be correctly assumed that other jurisdictions are not
nearly as concerned with the problem. The cases generally, how-
ever, seem to favor the strict application of the Hum rule, sup-
porting the position of the Second Circuit majority.' 3  But the
rules of the other Circuit Courts are not as clearly defined even
as that of the Second Circuit.44 Both Judge Clark and the Second
Circuit majority quarrel with the holding in the First Circuit,
which adopts the reasoning of a previous concurring opinion of
that court,45 that even where the trial judge may properly exert
his jurisdiction over a non-federal claim by the rule of pendent
jurisdiction, it is a matter of discretion with him, which discretion
may not be reversed on appeal. 4 6 Similarly typical of the loose-
ness with which the pendent jurisdiction rule is applied in juris-
dictions other than the Second Circuit is the Seventh Circuit de-
cision in Atkins v. Gordon,47 where the Hum case was not followed
but the court said, "It is unnecessary to discuss the unfair trade
method charges, for in view of the residence of the parties in the
same state, the Federal Court's jurisdiction is ,dependent upon
43. Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1950) (two causes of
action, no jurisdiction); Loew's Drive-In Theatres v. Park-In Theatres, 174 F.2d 547
(1st Cir. 1949) (two causes of action, no jurisdiction where claim of infringement joined
claim of unpaid royalties under licensing agreement); New Orleans Public Belt R. Co.
v. Wallace, 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949) (two causes of action, no joinder in suit
against railroad under federal Employer's Liability Act and non-federal claim of common
law tort); Crabb v. Welden Bros., 164 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1947) (two causes of action,
no jurisdiction); Pearce v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 162 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1947) (two
causes of action, no"joinder in suit against railroad under federal Employer's Liability Act
and non-federal claim of common law tort); United Lens Corp. v. Doray Lamp Co., 93 F.2d
969 (7th Cir. 1937) (jurisdiction accepted, saying cause of action is unlawful violation of
a right which facts show and counts arisirig therefrom are same cause of action); General
Motors Corp. v. Rubsam Corp., 67 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 688
(1933) (two causes of action, no jurisdiction).
44. E.g., compare United Lens Corp. v. Doray Lamp Co., supra note 43, with Atkins
v. Gordon, 86 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1936); and Loew's Drive-In Theatres v. Park-In
Theatres, supra note 43; with Massachusetts Univ. Cony. v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183
F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1950).
45. See Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion).
46. Massachusetts Univ. Cony. v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
47. 86 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1938).
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appellee's sustaining the patent infringement charges of the com-
plaint.""s This expeditious method of disposing of the question
of federal jurisdiction, apparently ignoring the pendent jurisdic-
tion rule, is, it would seem, clearly in error.
Some question might also be raised as to the propriety of the
extension of the Hum doctrine into fields other than copyright,
patent and trademark infringement. Although the Hum case in-
volved copyright infringement and most cases citing the Hum
case as binding have involved patent, trademark or copyright
infringement, the rule is apparently now settled to be not so re-
strictive. It has been held, for example, that the pendent jurisdic-
tion rule applied in a case where commerce, alleged to be inter-
state, was in fact intrastate and no other basis for federal juris-
diction existed.49 Other decisions of similar import are abundant.50
Because the extension of jurisdiction to the federal courts through
the pendent jurisdiction rule is clearly also a deprivation of the
jurisdiction of the state courts, the state becomes an interested
party in each case subject to the rule. There are, however, few
state court actions involving in any way this principle of dimin-
ishing jurisdiction. The existing decisions show little concern
with the encroachment of the federal courts upon state court
jurisdiction. It has been held, for example, that plaintiff's action
in a federal court upon a federal claim, with which he could have
joined a non-federal claim, was res judicata as to an action brought
in the state court on the non-federal claim."'. In another case,
the state court held, although two judges dissented, that plain-
tiff, whose federal claim had been rejected for lack of jurisdiction,
could bring a state court action, because although the existence
of a federal patent was incidentally involved, it did not lie at the
basis of plaintiff's claim.52 Where, however, the state court has
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, it cannot be
48. Ibid.
49. Southern Pac. Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1934).
50. Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942) (rule applied in case of seaman's
action for cure and maintenance, although the seaman's claim under the Jones Act was
withdrawn); Hogue v. National Automotive Parts Ass'n., 87 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Mich.
1949) .(rule applied in action for unpaid wages for hours covered by Fair Labor
Standards Act, where a claim was made for unpaid wages for hours covered by the Act);
Water Service Co. v. Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938) (rule applied, although the local
question was dismissed because of a lack of a substantial federal question, in a suit
to enjoin a city from receiving large grant from the federal government under the
NIRA, which it was alleged, was unconstitutional, the local* question being the appropria-
tion of proceeds from the sale of bonds for the same purpose).
51. McCann v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Spec. Term 1941).
52. Zenie v. Miskend, 245 App. Div. 634, 284 N.Y.Supp. 63 (First Dept. 1935) afl'd. 270
N.Y. 636, I N.E.2d 367 (1936).
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ousted of this jurisdiction by defendant's incidental claim that a
certain patent is invalid.
53
Whatever the state court's attitude is toward its diminishing
jurisdiction, the federal tendency, it seems clear, is toward the
position occupied by Judge Clark. Consistent with this is a recent
remedial statute,54 purporting to extend the doctrine of the Hum
case. What effect, if any, this statute will have upon the courts
must remain problematical because in the Kleinman case, where
the statute was sought to be applied, the court distinguished the
case and decided on other grounds.5 It is to be here noted that
the suggested changes embodied in the remedial statute and co-
gently asserted by Judge Clark are pointed in the right direction,
toward much-needed judicial economy for both the litigant and
the court, toward accelerated appellate process and toward greater
liberality in pleading. They cannot, however, of themselves out-
weigh the necessity for retaining wherein possible the constitu-
tional division of jurisdiction between federal and state courts.
The Second Circuit's tenacious resistance to the extension of the
pendent jurisdiction rule, which can only be made at the expense
of state court jurisdiction, is in this respect a healthy safeguard.
DANIEL J. CHAPMAN
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - LIMrrATIONS ON ACTIONS - THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO ACTIONS AGAINST DRAwERs
OF BANK DRAFTS. - Bank drafts are demand instruments drawn
by one bank upon another. They are drawn on funds deposited
in the drawee bank in the same manner as ordinary bank checks,
drawn by individuals. These drafts are used for the immediate
transfer of funds by the issuing bank or by individuals or corpora-
tions who purchase the drafts.
When a bank issues a draft drawn on a correspondent bank,
it immediately credits the account of the drawee for the amount
of the draft. The drawee bank, on the other hand, does not charge
the account of the drawer until the draft is presented and paid.
53. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
54. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. 51338 (b) (Supp. 1948): "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition
when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark
laws. "
55. The court held that there was in fact no unfair competition, the niceties of which
are discussed elsewhere in this note, and "therefore the statute, especially restricted to case
of unfair competition joined with patent, copyright or trademark infringement, did not
apply.
